mgr Piotr Jaskółka
The topic of my dissertation is „Status and justification of normative judgments in the light of the theory of naturalistic fallacy. Good as an object of practical philosophy”.
The main research problem of the dissertation is the question of justifying normative judgments in the light of the theory of naturalistic fallacy. It is necessary to indicate what causes the problem called the naturalistic fallacy (why it is an error) and the way of solving this problem, that is, a way of determining the good that avoids the said fallacy. The research hypothesis is the recognition of the naturalistic fallacy as defined by G. E. Moore (which - contrary to what Moore believed - is rooted in an attempt to understand good as a being) as a consequence of the abolition of the division into theory and practice. The fallacy noticed in the linguistic sphere is a consequence of an ontological fallacy. Since theoretical thinking does not have access to good, good should be treated as a necessary element of practice and explained from the perspective of practical philosophy, using relevant methods and concepts. In such a practical perspective, normative judgments must be justified in a way that differs from theoretical justification - not by means of making a reference to facts, but on the basis of fundamental normative premises.
It is a fact that the literature on the problem known as "naturalistic fallacy" first described by G. E. Moore in Principles of Ethics is abundant. Nonetheless, it is difficult to find a precise justification that the so-called naturalistic fallacy is in fact an error. Furthermore, indicating its sources is also problematic. Basing on the available materials, it is also difficult to present the Moore’s position precisely. As a result, the fallacy itself is understood differently by different researchers. The Kant’s erroneous psychological (or as Moore puts it: ‘naturalistic’) interpretation in analytical philosophy has failed to allow for a satisfactory solution to the problem. As a result, the Kantian solution has not been properly explored. It should be justified that the fallacy identified by Moore is indeed a fundamental problem in terms of the definition and the concept of good. This may allow for indicating a possible solution to the problem.